The present paper applies a theoretical two-sector three-factor model to analyze a variety of energy tax reforms with the common feature of at least partly exempting the energy-intensive export sector from the tax. As a result, all scenarios with exemptions reduce energy less than the non-discriminating textbook version of the energy tax. Moreover, in the two scenarios that exemplify typical attributes of the tax reforms in Germany and Denmark, an increase in total energy use is possible. This is due to a positive output effect resulting from a substitution of the energy-intensive for the labor-intensive commodity.
Introduction
In Europe, several countries have introduced energy taxes that are environmentally motivated.
The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands already implemented CO 2 taxes at the beginning of the nineties 1 and most recently, Germany followed by introducing an ecological tax reform in 1999 2 . Other European countries like Italy and the U.K. have a tradition of high energy taxes that are fiscally motivated. With respect to its effect on energy demand, such a distinction, however, is irrelevant.
It is typical of most of these tax systems that energy-and/or export-intensive sectors are at least partly exempted from the tax. In Sweden, for example, the tax rate for the industrial sector is only 25 percent of the general tax rate 3 . In Denmark, energy-intensive firms have the option of committing themselves to reducing their emissions to a negotiated level, in which case the tax on remaining emissions is substantially reduced. Switzerland intends to fully exempt major emittents from carbon dioxide taxes provided they implement energy-saving measures 4 . As an exception to the rule, the Netherlands does not provide such tax reliefs on the use of carbon dioxide. However, the tax rate in this country is so moderate that the resulting commodity price increases only amount to a few percent 5 .
From an efficiency point of view, such tax exemptions have no rationale, since marginal abatement costs among emittents will not be equalized and, therefore, total costs to attain a given standard are not minimized. The motivation behind such tax reliefs is political. If a country unilaterally introduces environmental taxes such as an energy tax, its export industry fears losing international competitiveness and market share. Hence, if this sector has a strong political influence, it is granted a tax reduction or is even exempted from paying the new energy tax 6 .
The additional revenue from environmental taxes is typically used in order to reduce -or not to raise -other existing taxes. It is noteworthy that such a general reduction in existing taxes does not exclude the energy-intensive sectors. Such a reimbursement scheme is realized in Germany, where the tax yield is used to uniformly cut social insurance contributions in all sectors 7 . In Denmark, the tax burden in the industrial sector is further reduced by redistributing the revenue back to this sector. In all these cases, it can be expected that the tax reform favors the exempted sector, which will expand at the cost of the other sectors.
Furthermore, since the exempted sector is energy-intensive, the possibility arises that due to structural changes the tax reform will lead to increased total energy consumption. This paper seeks to analyze the effects of such exemption rules on total energy use and to identify conditions under which energy use is raised. improved ambient air quality. All these models incorporate many sectors and several factors, but they do not address the topic of discriminating factor taxes. A noteworthy exception is Böhringer and Rutherford (1997) , who calculate the welfare cost of exemptions in Germany's energy policy. They also reveal that direct wage subsidies constitute a more cost-effective measure to maintain jobs in the export sector while still reducing total energy consumption to a given level.
The present paper shifts the focus from welfare analysis to the investigation of structural changes due to discriminating energy taxes. It isolates the effects that raise or reduce total energy use and compares the size of these effects within a theoretically tractable model.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and derives a general result as a function of relative factor and commodity prices. Section 3 introduces four scenarios and 7 Center for European Economic Research (1999).
discusses the results with respect to total energy use. Finally, section 4 summarizes and concludes.
The Model
In order to analyze the effects of energy taxes with exemptions, a model is chosen comprising a mixture of the traditional Harberger model and the model used in Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994b) . While the former depicts two sectors with different factor intensities, the latter introduces three factors, of which labor is immobile and capital as well as energy are traded internationally. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the model. One sector produces a tradable merchandise and is assumed to be energy-intensive. The other sector supplies a non-tradable commodity such as services and is assumed to be labor-intensive 8 . On the factor level, the domestic household trades energy and capital (in the domestically consumed good) with labor (in the exported good). Government transfers the energy tax yield back to the household or to labor. Table 1 gives a mathematical description of the model. 8 Since there are three factors of production, the reciprocity between energy-and labor intensity does not necessarily hold. To be precise, it is assumed that the cost share of energy is higher in the tradable sector and the cost share of labor is higher in the non-tradable sector. 
Household:
Trade balance
Notation: 9 Where applied, the labor tax rate is negative, i.e. labor is subsidized. The household's utility is homothetic and depends on the consumption of the non-tradable and the domestically consumed tradable good (I.5 and I.6). Environmental quality is not included in the utility function, since the focus of the paper is on energy input but not on welfare 10 . For the same reason, labor is supplied at a given quantity, which gives rise to the budget constraint (I.7).
Government:
The government collects energy taxes that are redistributed as a lump-sum to the household or used to subsidize labor (I.8). There is no public good supplied. This simplification does not affect the results as long as the supply of the public good is fixed exogenously and it is weakly separable from the privately consumed goods.
International trade:
With the tradable good market (I.9) and the factor markets (I.10) in equilibrium, the trade balance (I.11) follows from Walras' law. It is assumed that the prices of the traded commodity and factors are given by world market prices.
In order to derive the reduced forms for a marginal change in energy taxes, the model is loglinearized. Table 2 Y , factor demand in sector m is not further disaggregated. 10 Moreover, if the reduction in energy use contributes to a global public good, its impact on domestic utility can be igmored. 
Trade balance Taxes:
Endogenous variables:
With the model as represented in table 2, we first derive a semi-reduced form of total energy use as a function of relative commodity and factor prices. This general result can then be used to calculate the result of different tax reform scenarios.
Because labor input is exogenous, total energy use is expressed conditional on labor.
Equations II.9c and II.2 yield:
(
Next, 
The Turning to consumption, s Ỹ is derived, using budget constraint II.7, commodity demand II.6
and the government budget II.8:
11 The distinction between output and factor substitution effect goes back to Mieszkowski. 
Solving for Ẽ , the semi-reduced result as a function of relative price changes is derived: 
With sector s labor-intensive and sector m energy-intensive, the term in front of the braces in equation (6) hand, total energy demand rises, income and consumption increase. In this case, a shift from energy-intensive exports to labor-intensive non-tradables takes place, and the initial energy increase is reduced. Note that the income effect does not change the sign of the result, which is determined by the terms in the braces of (6) alone.
Results of four scenarios
Four scenarios are evaluated. The first scenario (REF) corresponds to the textbook version of the energy tax and serves as a reference point. Two other scenarios, labeled GER and DEN, represent a stylized version of the tax reform in Germany and Denmark. Of course, these two scenarios do not precisely describe all the features of the rather complicated tax schemes in these countries. Rather, they focus on special regulations to reduce the tax burden of the energy-intensive sector. Finally, the scenario GER* is a refinement of the basic scenario GER.
The relative commodity and factor prices of the four scenarios are presented in table 3. 
In this scenario, a uniform energy tax rate without exemption is applied. The tax revenue is redistributed lump-sum to the household according to (II.8a).
With the given world market price of the exported good, an increase in the energy price must be compensated for by a fall in the producer price of labor. The price of energy as well as the price of the composite factor N, therefore, rise relative to labor. As a consequence, all the substitution effects are negative.
The factor price changes do not alter the price of the tradable commodity. The price of the non-tradable commodity, however, decreases due to the different factor intensities. The household substitutes the non-tradable for the energy-intensive tradable good, which reduces energy use.
Thus, in the reference scenario, all the substitution effects as well as the output effect on energy are negative. Moreover, the reduction in energy use erodes the base of the existing energy tax and additionally distorts the energy market from a purely fiscal point of view. Real income falls, which, in the case of homothetic utility, leads to an equal reduction in demand for the non-tradable and the tradable commodity. With labor supply given, production is shifted to the exported commodity, which causes energy input to rise again. As mentioned above, the income effect, therefore, lessens the initial effect on total energy use.
Scenario GER:
In this scenario the energy-intensive export sector is exempted from the energy tax but the revenue recycling does not discriminate between the two sectors.
Since the export sector is not taxed, the non-profit condition requires that the producer price of labor remains unchanged. Thus, there is no factor substitution in the export sector. In the domestic sector, on the other hand, the energy price and the price of the composite factor increase relative to labor and give rise to a negative substitution effect on energy.
The energy tax increase in the domestic sector raises the relative commodity price of non- 
From equation 7, we can deduce that the possibility of an energy increase rises with (a) the substitution elasticity in utility relative to the substitution elasticities in production, (b) the difference in factor intensities and (c) the expenditure share of the domestically consumed tradable good.
It can be shown that a necessary condition for energy use to rise is that the substitution elasticity in utility is larger than a weighted average of the substitution elasticities in production. A sufficient condition for energy use to rise, on the other hand, is that the elasticities in production vanish. Such a limitational production function in the domestic sector might prevail in the short run. Therefore, an increase in total energy use due to the exemption of the export sector is more plausible in the short run.
Scenario GER*:
Instead of exempting the whole export sector from paying the energy tax, it is conceivable to restrict the exemption on the exported goods only. In Switzerland, such a tax scheme is applied with respect to volatile organic compounds (VOC) -a substance that is used, for example, as a component of varnish and paint. The VOC charge is refunded to firms that use the substance in the production of goods to be exported.
With such a tax, the producer price of labor is still unchanged. However, since the tradable sector now pays taxes on energy in domestically sold products, a factor substitution in the production of these goods takes place 12 . The factor substitution in the non-tradable sector remains unaltered when compared with the scenario GER. However, the output effect in the scenario GER* is negative. Since both domestically consumed commodities are subject to the energy tax and since the tradable good is energy-intensive, the relative consumer price of the tradable good rises, and the substitution of the non-tradable good reduces total energy demand. With all the effects being negative, the scenario GER* unambiguously reduces total energy use. Moreover, the reduction is always stronger than in the scenario GER.
Scenario DEN:
It is a special feature of the Danish tax system that the tax paid by the industrial sector is used to lower the employers' contribution to social insurance in this sector 13 . Therefore, in the scenario DEN, a uniform tax rate across all sectors is applied and the tax yield of the nontradable sector is used to reduce the producer price of labor in that sector. The revenue from the non-tradable sector, on the other hand, is redistributed lump-sum to the household. While in the scenario GER the exemption refers to the energy tax, the scenario DEN discriminates with respect to the reimbursement scheme. In both scenarios, the price of the tradable good does not vary while the price of the non-tradable increases due to the higher energy tax. Thus, an equivalent change of relative commodity prices results. The equivalence also holds for the relative factor prices in the non-tradable sector. This is due to the fact that in both scenarios the producer price of labor remains unchanged in this sector. In contrast to GER, however, the relative factor prices in the industrial sector vary in DEN because the energy price rises while the producer price of labor is reduced. Hence, there is an additional negative substitution effect in the scenario DEN, which makes an increase in total energy use less likely than in the scenario GER. In any case, the tax reform in DEN results in a smaller change of energy than in GER 14 .
Comparing DEN and GER*, the results with respect to total energy use are ambiguous. While the output effect is positive in DEN and negative in GER*, DEN causes stronger substitution effects. The size of these two countervailing effects depends on the model parameters.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper is based on the observation that in most European countries which implemented environmentally motivated energy taxes, energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors are at least partly exempted from paying the tax. The paper is intended to analyze the effects of these special regulations on total energy use. For this purpose a model with an energy-intensive tradable and a labor-intensive non-tradable commodity is applied. Furthermore, the model consists of three factors, of which energy and capital are traded at world market prices while labor is immobile and supplied exogenously.
Two scenarios are identified in which tax reform may increase total energy use. Such a result, obviously unintended by the policy maker, is always possible if an exemption of the energyintensive export sector reduces the relative commodity price of this sector. In this case, a substitution of the energy-intensive for the labor-intensive good causes a positive output effect on total energy use. In the scenario labeled GER, such a positive output effect is due to the tax exemption of the energy-intensive sector. In the scenario labeled DEN, on the other hand, the positive output effect originates from a discriminating redistribution of the tax revenue. In this scenario, both sectors are subject to a uniform energy tax, but while the tax yield of the energy-intensive sector is used to subsidize labor in this sector, the tax paid by the laborintensive sector is redistributed lump-sum to the household.
If the exemption of the energy tax is restricted to the exported goods (as shown in scenario GER*), the relative price of domestically consumed goods does not change and, as a consequence, no output effect on total energy use occurs. The same applies if, in contrast to scenario DEN, the tax yield in both sectors is used to reduce the producer price of labor in the respective sectors.
With respect to factor substitution, it is derived that, in the textbook scenario which does not discriminate between sectors, the effect on energy is the strongest. In the exemption scenarios, the factor substitution effects are reduced or even eliminated. Not surprisingly, the textbook scenario, therefore, yields the largest reduction in energy.
Finally, starting from a benchmark with existing energy taxes, there is an income effect on energy caused by a change of the energy tax base. If, for example, energy use decreases, the distortion in the energy market is reinforced from a purely fiscal point of view and real income is reduced. With labor supply given exogenously, such a reduction in real income is reflected in a shift between domestically consumed and exported goods, which lessens the initial decrease in energy input.
Because of exogenous labor supply, no labor tax is modeled in the benchmark. By the same token, the additional revenue from the energy tax raise is redistributed lump-sum to the household in all the scenarios except in the discriminating scenario DEN. If, on the other hand, labor supply were modeled endogenously, it would be sensible to introduce labor taxes in the benchmark and to use the additional revenue from the energy tax to cut labor taxes.
Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994a and 1994b) have shown that in such a model the erosion of the energy tax base is equivalent to a reduction in real after-tax wages. With positiveuncompensated -wage elasticity, labor supply would fall and the overall production level as well as energy input would be reduced. The same argumentation with reversed signs would apply to a situation where the energy tax base is enlarged. The size of this additional effect crucially depends on the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply, which in most empirical studies, however, is rather small 15 .
